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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
This is a petition for review of the final order of 
The Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utan, 
which order is the Denial of Motion for Review, R. at 432. 
Said order, in denying Petitioner's Motion for Review, 
affirmed and adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order of Administrative Law Judge Keith E. Sohm, 
dated November 5, 1984, that Respondent Kimbal suffered an 
injury by "accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment" with Petitioner, and should be compensated pur-
suant to the terms of Section 35-1-45 Utah Code Annotated. 
Disposition in the Administrative Hearing 
On February 5, 1985, the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed a prior Order of an 
Administrative Law Judge that Respondent Kimbal had suffered 
an injury, within the meaning of Section 35-1-45 Utah Code 
Annotated, while employed by Petitioner. In so affirming, 
the Board of Review adopted the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order previously entered, R. at 
411-415. 
Statement of the Facts 
Respondent Bret Kimbal (hereinafter Kimbal) was a 
full-time employee of Kimbal Storm Windows, a family busi-
ness, during 1982, Testimony of Bret Kimbal, R. at 38,39; 
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Testimony of his father, Donald Kimbal, R. at 292,293. This 
was storm window installation work. Kimbal also worked 
parttime as a doorman and bouncer for Petitioner Bigfoots, 
Inc., a beer bar and night club located in Ogden 
(hereinafter Bigfoots), R. at 26. Part of Kimbal's regular 
duties as an employee of Bigfoots was to stock the beer 
cooler with beer at the end of the evening, Testimony of 
Bret Kimbal, R. at 27-28. 
On June 19, 1982, while performing his usual beer-
loading activities for Bigfoots, Kimbal claims to have 
injured his back, R. at 30-31. Kimbal testified that he 
jumped out of bed the next day and when his leg hit the 
floor, it gave out, R. at 32. He consulted a chiropractor, 
Dr. Lane, the next work day, Monday, June 21, 1982, R. at 
33. Dr. Lane's treatments did not relieve Kimbalfs pain 
satisfactorily, so he went to see his family physician, Dr. 
Hyde, on June 28, 1982, R. at 34; Testimony of Dr. Hyde, R. 
at 118. Not satisfied with Dr. Hyde's conservative treat-
ment, Kimbal went to see his other family physician, Dr. 
Paul, R. at 35. Dr. Paul referred Kimbal to Dr. Church, a 
neurosurgeon, R. at 36. Conservative treatment under Dr. 
Church, including physical therapy and traction, did not 
work out, and Kimbal underwent surgery for a herniated disc 
after a CAT scan and myelogram confirmed this, R. at 36. 
Kimbal did not work at either job from June 19, 1982 until 
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November 1, 1982, when he resumed working in the family 
storm window business in a supervisory capacity. 
Kimbal applied for worker's compensation benefits, 
alleging that he had injured his back while loading beer 
cases for Bigfoots on June 19, 1982, R. at 5-6. An initial 
hearing on Kimbalfs claim was held on March 7, 1984, at 
which only Kimbal testified, R. at 23-46. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that an accident had 
occurred, and referred the case to a medical panel for a 
disability evaluation, R. at 45. 
The medical panel consisted of Dr. John M. Bender 
only, Testimony of Dr. Bender, R. at 180. In a letter to 
Administrative Law Judge Keith E. Sohm, R. at 89-91, Dr. 
Bender testified that he had reviewed Dr. Church's surgical 
report, the summary of the March 7, 1984 hearing, and a pre-
operative CT scan of Kimbal fs low back, R. at 89. Dr. 
Bender did not undertake to obtain any other medical 
records, such as those of Dr. Lane, Dr. Hyde or Dr. Paul, R. 
at 183-184. Basing his opinion on only limited information, 
Dr. Bender concluded, inter alia, that Kimbal had no previ-
ously existing condition which contributed to a physical 
impairment, and that there was no pre-existing impaired con-
dition, R. at 90. 
At a subsequent hearing, held on September 27, 
1984, Dr. Bender testified that his earlier conclusions 
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could have been affected if he had known about Kimbalfs hav-
ing both experienced prior lower back pain and seeking and 
receiving chiropractic treatment for it, R. at 185-186. Dr. 
Bender also testified his conclusions might have been 
affected if he had been made aware of a May or early June, 
1982 problem Kimbal had with his back, R. at 191-192. 
Both Dr. Bender and Dr. Church agreed that Kimbalfs 
ruptured disc could have been caused by any number of 
events, including every day occurrences. See generally, 
testimony of Dr. Bender, R. at 179-199; testimony of Dr. 
Church, R. 49-71. 
Kimbal did in fact, have a prior low back injury 
for which he sought help. Dr. Jack R. Lane, a chiropractor, 
testified at the September 27, 1984 hearing that he had 
treated Kimbal in April of 1981 for "acute lumbo-sacral 
strain," R. at 130, which had been triggered by Kimbalfs 
simply reaching down to pick up a bar of soap, R. at 131. 
Dr. Lane took X-rays, which revealed that "the left ilium 
had been rotated posteriorally and inferiorally," R. at 131, 
lines 22-23. Kimbal complained, at that time, of low back 
pain and pain down the legs, R. at 130-132. 
Dr. Lane again saw Kimbal, after his alleged acci-
dent at Bigfoots, on June 22, 1982, R. at 132. Kimbal com-
plained of similar symptoms to those complained of in April, 
1981, R. at 133. In fact, Dr. Lane testified that "the left 
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hip had rotated again." R. at 133, lines 24-25 (emphasis 
added). Dr. Lane testified that on June 22, 1982, Kimbal 
did not know the cause of his back pain, R. at 134, and that 
he made a specific note of this, R. at 338. On his next 
visit, June 23, 1982, Kimbal informed Dr. Lane that he might 
have hurt his back at Bigfoots, R. at 135. Dr. Lane agreed 
with Drs. Bender and Church that Kimbal's injury could have 
been caused when he jumped out of bed on June 20, 1982, R. 
at 137. 
Dr. Oliver Wendell Hyde, Jr., also testified at the 
September 27, 1984 hearing, R. at 109-127. He testified 
that he examined Kimbal on June 28, 1982, at which time 
Kimbalfs complaint was of low back pain, R. at 118. Kimbal 
did not mention an industrial injury at Bigfoots, as indi-
cated by the absence of any business record of Dr. Hyde 
showing an accident report, R. at 118-119. Kimbal did not 
complain of leg pain to Dr. Hyde, R. at 121. 
At the September 27, 1984 hearing, Patrick McGuire, 
a police officer and part-time bouncer at Bigfoots with 
Kimbal, testified that Kimbal had complained to him in late 
May of 1982 about hurting his back while working in the fam-
ily business, R. at 150, and that Kimbal complained again a 
week later about back pain, R. at 151. Another fellow 
bouncer, one "Tiny" (Donald Pearson) testified that Kimbal 
had complained of slipping and falling off a ladder at work 
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and hurting his back, R. at 222. Kimbal never mentioned to 
Tiny that he hurt his back lifting a case of beer, R. at 
228. 
The Administrative Law Judge, after the September 
27, 1984 hearing, adopted the findings of the medical panel 
as to both disability rating and any pre-ex:sting condition, 
R. at 413-414, despite the testimony of irs. Bender and 
Church that Kimbal never told them of either prior low back/ 
leg pain or Dr. Lane's X-rays and treatment of the same in 
April of 1981. Bigfoots filed a Motion for Review of the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge, R. at 417-418, 
which Motion was denied by the Industrial Commission on 
February 5, 1985, R. at 432-433. Bigfoots then filed a 
Petition for Review in this court on February 22, 1985, R. 
at 443-444. 
SUMMARY OR ARGUMENT 
That the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
that there was an industrial "accident," within the meaning 
of Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, was arbitrary and 
capricious. Counsel will argue that nothing in the nature 
of an accident occurred. Counsel will also argue that the 
recommendation of the medical panel was arbitrary and capri-
cious, so that, in the alternative to an outright reversal 
of the decision of the Industrial Commission, this court 
should remand the case for further medical panel proceedings 
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in light of the evidence of Kimbal's pre-existing back con-
dition. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
THAT AN INDUSTRIAL OCCIDENT HAD OCCURRED, 
ARE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
In reviewing findings by the Industrial Commission, 
the scope of inquiry of the Supreme Court is whether those 
findings are arbitrary and capricious, i.e. wholly without 
cause, contrary to the one inevitable conclusion, or without 
any evidence to support them. Moyes v. State of Utah, 7 
U.A.R. 39, No. 19236, April 5, 1985; Billings Computer Corp. 
v
* Tarango, 674 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1983); Pittsburgh Testing 
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983); Sabofs 
Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982); Kaiser 
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P. 2d 888 (Utah 1981). It is 
submitted that such is the a se here. 
In the Monfredi ca5.e, this Court reviewed a series 
of back injury cases in which it had determined the meaning 
of the word "accident" under Section 35-1-45, Utah Code 
Annotated. This Court held that whether an "accident" had 
occurred is a question of law to be decided by the 
Industrial Commission, see also, Pintar v. Industrial 
Commission, 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 (1963). 
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Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 
(Utah 1982) , is a case on point. Prior to going to the 
store on June 5, 1979, defendant Sabo was performing a usual 
job duty, to wit: loading some merchandise into his service 
bus from the warehouse. As he prepared to lift a box of 
twelve clock radios, he experienced back pain. The next 
day, he was diagnosed, at a local hospital, as suffering 
from a herniated disc. He sought chiropractic care because 
he could not afford surgery. 642 P. 2d 722, at 723. Sabo 
also had a prior history of back pain, having slipped and 
fallen in 1951 while working in a mine. This caused him to 
see a chiropractor periodically. Sabo also developed neck 
and shoulder pain, and took steroid shots. 642 P.2d 722, at 
723. 
Following a hearing on December 10, 1979, the admi-
nistrative law judge found that no "accident" had occurred. 
The case was then referred to a medical panel, consisting of 
one doctor, who found that there was no evidence of a pre-
existing condition and that Sabo had a permanent physical 
impairment resulting entirely from his "accident". The 
administrative law judge adopted all of the medical panel 
report. 642 P.2d 722, at 724. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, observing: 
Accident has been broadly defined as 
"an unanticipated, unintended occurrence 
different from what would normally be 
expected to occur in the usual course of 
events". Carling v. Industrial 
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Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P. 2d 202 
(1965). The accident must result in an 
injury which is causally related to the 
work being done. Painter Motor Co. v. 
Ostler, 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980); Schmidt 
v. Industrial Commission, 617 P. 2d 693 
(Utah 1980). The mere showing of an 
injury does not ipso facto mean that a 
compensable accident has occurred. 642 
P.2d 722, at 725. 
After discussing a number of prior decisions, the 
Sabo court held: 
...There is nothing in the doctor's eval-
uation which would justify a change from 
the initial decision that no "accident" 
occurred. The mere fact that defendant's 
impairment resulted (in the words of Dr. 
Moraberger) "entirely from the incident 
which he alleges to" should not imply 
that a compensable accident has occurred, 
as defined in this opinion. It appears 
to be mere coincidence that defendant's 
injury or malfunction occurred at work. 
642 P.2d 722, at 726. 
Similarly, in the present case, there is no evi-
dence of an "accident," i.e. of an unanticipated, unintended 
occurrence. As mentioned in the Statement of Facts, Kimbal 
was performing his normal, usual duty of stocking the beer 
cooler when his back hurt him. This was something that he 
did at the end of each night on which he worked at Bigfoots. 
A year earlier, he had injured his back while routinely 
bending over to pick up a bar of soap off the shower floor, 
Testimony of Dr. Lane, R. at 130-131. Additionally, Kimbal 
had been in an automobile accident in 1979, suffering a 
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whiplash injury, and complained to Dr. Lane of neck problems 
"for years," R. at 132. All of these factors together with 
the medical testimony that almost anything can cause a disc 
to rupture, combine to lead to one conclusion - that it was 
purely coincidental that Kimbal hurt his back at Bigfoots. 
The Finding by the Industrial Commission that a compensable 
"accident" occurred, is, therefore, c.bitary and capricious. 
POINT II. 
THE MEDICAL PANEL'S FINDINGS ARE 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
Dr. Bender relied only on limited evidence in 
arriving at his conclusions, said evidence being only Dr. 
Church's surgical report, a preoperative CT scan of the low 
back, and an interview of Mr. Kimbal. See Medical Panel 
Report, R. at 89. He did not undertake to obtain any 
records other than those supplied by the administrative law 
judge, R. at 183. Dr. Bender admitted that, in terms of any 
prior or pre-existing condition, (#; 4,5, and 6) of his 
report, R. at 90), a previous injur/ could be significant 
and that it might have been detected by a careful reading of 
the X-rays taken by Dr. Lane, R. at 186. He also testified 
that he could not tell when the disc herniation initially 
started, as it had already been remedied surgically when he 
examined Mr. Kimbal, R. at 189. Dr. Church, the surgeon, 
also testified that he could not t^ ll exactly when the her-
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niation occurred, R. at 164, 167, 171. Additionally, as 
mentioned in the Statement of Facts, there was evidence 
adduced from Patrick McGuire and Donald Pearson, that Kimbal 
had complained of low back pain to them prior to his alleged 
accident. 
Thus, it is apparent that Dr. Bender's Medical 
Panel Report, findings #4, 5 and 6, are arbitrary and capri-
cious because they were not based upon all available infor-
mation and, apparently, Kimbal withheld deliberately from 
them the information about his 1981 injury and treatment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above and foregoing reasons, this Court 
should reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission, 
or, in the alternative, remand for further medical panel 
proceedings to determine the effect of Kimbal's pre-existing 
condition upon his injury. 
DATED this r^^~day of 6 U A ^ ^ I A , 1985. 
MARQUAPDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 202 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
T2lephone: 801-621-3662 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
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i 7 - ^ I hereby certify that on this \J$ day o f 
August, 1985, I mailed four true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing Petitioner's Brief, postage prepaid, to : 
Stephen W. Farr 
Attorney for Respondent Kimbal 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Ralph Finlayson 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Sale Lake City, UT 84114. 
MARTIN WTCUSTEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 83000961 
BRET KIMBALL, * 
Applicant * DENIAL OF 
* 
vs. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
BIGFOOT'S INCORPORATED * 
A UTAH CORPORATION, * 
(UNINSURED), * 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On or about November 5, 1984,, an Order was entered by an Administra-
tive Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above 
entitled case. 
On or about November 7, 1984,, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Defendant by and through their attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDLRED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of November 5, 1934, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
-tit 
j£> - day of February, 1985. 
ATTEST: 
Linda J. Strasburg /// 
/ / Commission Secretary \J 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Walter T. Axelgard 
Commissioner 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF TTTAn 
Case No. 83000961 
BRET KIMBAL, 
vs. 
Applicant, 
BIGFOOTfS, INCORPORATED, 
a UTAH CORPORATION, 
(uninsured) 
Defendants• 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
FIND! ,GS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ORDER 
HEARINGS: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
HEARING ON 
OBJECTIONS: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 7, 
1984, at 1:00 p.m. 
Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge 
The applicant was present and represented by Steven W. 
Farr. 
The defendants were represented by Ray Stoddard. 
McKay-Dee Hospital, 3939 Harrison Blva., Room El, 
Level B, Ogden, Utah on September 27, 1984 at 10:00 
p.m. Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of 
the Commission. 
Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge 
The applicant was present and represei»ted by Steven W. 
Farr. 
The defendants were represented by David J. Knowlton, 
Attorney at Law. 
The original order was entered setting forth the facts in this case 
and finding that the applicant was injured during the course of his employment 
with the defendant company and that the incident was an accident, as defined 
by the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
BRET E. KIMBAL 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
The Order further'required the payment of meJical bills, to date, and 
ordered the defendants to pay $3,810.50 for temporary t^tal disability 
compensation and further referred the matter to a medical panel. The order 
was entered against Brill Sevy, dba Bigfoot's, an uninsured. 
The defendants objected to the order being entered against Brill Sevy 
and produced subsequent evidence indicating that the employe^, Bigfoot's, was, 
in fact, a corporation and the interim order was amended accordingly by the 
judge*s order of August 28, 1984. 
The defendants further objected to the order, stating that subsequent 
discovered evidence would indicate that the applicant may have been injured on 
another job. By letter, dated August 28, 1984, the administrative law judge 
permitted the reopening of the case for taking of additional testimony and 
allowed that further testimony to be introduced at a subsequent hearing on the 
objections to the medical panel. 
The medical panel returned itfs report, copies of which were 
circulated to all of the parties. The defendants objected to that report, so 
the matter involving the objections and the reopening of the case for 
additional testimony was set in Ogden for September 27, 1984. 
— " " 7 
At the subsequent hearing, the applicants objected to the 
introduction of additional testimony concerning the conditions under which the 
applicant was injured and further objected to the defendants1 production of 
medical witnesses. The objections were overruled and all of the evidence 
tendered by both sides was received. 
As to the defendants* contention that the applicant was not hurt on 
the job, the defendants introduced evidence of other employees who indicated 
that they had never heard the applicant complain about an injury. One witness 
indicated that the applicant handled the beer cases effectively and walked 
normal, but did say his back was hurting while lifting the Deer, although he 
never did say that he hurt his back on the job. Another witness stated that 
the applicant had complained earlier about his back being sore and that he had 
hurt his back working in his father's business when he had slipped off of a 
ladder. The applicant denied ever injuring himself in a fall from a ladder in 
his father's business. On the night of the injury, the applicant had 
mentioned something about being afraid that his ladder out on the truck might 
be stolen. 
The applicant reiterated the events that transpired at the time of 
his back injury on June 19, 1 Q ^ The defendant also called the applicant's 
family practitioner who indicated that the applicant had an appointment on 
June 28
 f 1982 r afc which t\mQ b* complained of a low back pain, but did not 
mention an iTirinsfrH A! F^Hftfif.. No x-rays were taken because there was no 
outward evidence of a herniated disc, but the doctor gave the applicant a 
muscle relaxant and back exercises. On^October 6, 1982, the applicant came^in 
BRET E. KIMBAL 
ORDER 
PAGE THREE 
defendants ^Iso called the applicant* s chiropractor who testified that he 
treated the applicant on April 15, 1981 for an acute lumbosacral strain, with 
some radiation into uoth legs, which happened when the applicant was reaching 
over to pick up a bar of soap. The applicant had six (6) treatments for that 
problem. The record of the chiropractor also indicated that the applicant had 
had a whiglarsh IT> -iQ7Qt yhi^h hid given h*™ ^^o pr?blems. L The next visit to 
the chiropractor was June 22. 1982f when the applicant indicated that he woke 
1
,lC_WifH >>*«* Ha^k hurting hut did not 1m QV ™hY ^_nT1 T"no 23, 1982, the next 
day, the applicant was treated by the "chiropractor again and, this time, he 
indicated that ha probably hurt his back lifting a keg of beer at Bigfoot's^) 
The treating physician, Dr. Church, a neurosurgeon, was also called 
to testify and confirmed that the applicant had complained about back pains 
and left leg pains, giving a history of back injury at his work at Bigfoot's. 
Dr. Church agreed with Dr. Bender's medical panel report. 
The applicant's father, who runs a business known as Kimbal Storm 
Windows, acknowledged that the applicant was employed by him during 1982 on a 
full-time basis until he was injured June 19, 1982. The father denied the 
applicant >ffl<? injured r^ ^ <» jnh af qny timer but did mention that when Bret 
Kimbal came to work on the Monday following June 19. 1982, his back was sore 
and he was dragging his leg. He verified that the applicant could not 
continue his work for him because"of his back condition. 
Although the defendants introduced evidence concerning statements 
made by the applicant that he had injured his back previously and that he had 
complained about his back hurting previously, there Vfts no evidence to refute 
the applicants claim that he^jtfas—inspired while Tiffing a1 Veg—e£—beer at 
• Riftfoofs on June 19, 1982 as alleged by the aoplican^. By ^t?fnfpt—^ke 
applicant* s r-taims—rre entiled fn the benefit nf f^o doubt unless there _is 
convincing evidence ho the contrary.^ Tho prhnj r\j strati ve law .judge cannot find 
any convincing evidence to the mnfrrary—«nHJ therefore, finds that the" 
app 1 icant was injui/ed on his job at Bigfoofs on June 19
 f "Qg? fsr ^hieh he 
required medical treatment and was required to discontinue work for a period 
of time. 
There was no evidence which substantially conflicted with the medical 
panel and the medical panel verified its position as set forth in its report, 
which was alsc supported by Dr. Church. The medical panel report was received 
in evidence and the administrative law judge adopts the findings of the 
medical panel as his own, which are as follows: 
1. There is medically demonstrable causal relationship between the 
applicant's residual symptoms and signs and the industrial 
accident. The applicant was found to have herniated 
inter-vertebral disc following his industrial injury and 
subsequently underwent surgery for this problem. His residual 
symptoms and signs are secondary to this injury. 
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The applicant was temporarily totally disabled as a result of 
the industrial injury from the date of the injury until November 
1, 1982. At that time he began doing some supervisory work not 
requiring any lifting. It is noted that his operating surgeon 
did not release him to return to work until February 1983, at 
that point with lifting restrictions of approximately 40 pounds. 
The applicants total physical impairment resulting from the 
industrial injury is now 9% total percentage and 7% combined 
percentage. These percentages are arrived at using the Guides 
to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment as follows: Loss of 
flexion of the lumbosacral spine equal 1%, loss of extension of 
the lumbosacral spine equal 1%, loss of flexion of the left hip 
equal 2%, which is total 4% of the whole man due to loss of 
motion. There is 5% physical impairment secondary to operation 
on intervertebral disc lesion. 
4. All of the permanent physical impairment could be attributed to 
the applicant's industrial injury. 
The applicant has no previously existing condition which 
contributes to a physical impairment. 
There is no pre-existing impaired condition. 
Surgery and post-operative therapy were necessitated by the 
applicant's industrial accident. 
8. The applicant should not require further medical or surgical 
treatment as a result of his injury. He has been instructed to 
limit stooping and lifting and if he lives within these 
limitations, further complications requiring treatment are not 
reasonably anticipated. 
As set forth in the interim order, the applicant is entitled to 
temporary total disability compensation in the amount of $3,810.50 and payment 
of medical expenses, which at the time of that order were $6,114.76. The 
applicant is further entitled to permanent partial impairment benefits based 
on $171.00 per week for 21.84 weeks (7% of 312 weeks), which would equal a 
total of $3,734.64 for permanent partial impairment benefit. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The defendant corporation should pay the applicant the sum set forth 
above. 
BRET D. KIMBAL 
ORDER 
PAGE FIVE 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants pay the applicant $3,810.50 
for temporary total disability compensation and $3,734.64 for permanent 
partial impairment benefits and $6,114.76 to the medical providers for medical 
costs plus any costs which might have been incurred subsequent to the date of 
that calculation period. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of this accident, in accordance with the Medical and 
Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Steven Farr, attorney for the applicant, 
be paid the sum of $1,509, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Keith E. Sohm 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah^ Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
^<^ day of November, 1984. 
ATTEST: 
'"Linda J. SXp^rsburg 
Commission/Secretary 
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